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Abstract 
 
Advocates of financial regulation, Arestis and Demetriades, argue that financial liberalisation 
does not impact on financial market efficiency and the allocation of investment.  Results in this 
study find that Czech, Hungarian and Polish firms are subject to scrutiny when applying for 
credit.  The firm’s ability to provide collateral, the potential of the proposed investment project 
and individual financial backgrounds are all factors that are used before loans are offered, and it 
likely that allocational efficiency is strengthened in these circumstances, and not weakened.   
Stiglitz has the view that financial repression improves the quality of the pool of loans.  Results 
here indicate that companies in these countries previously had very limited access to credit while 
government owned companies and government projects received the bulk of credit.  After 
deregulation it became apparent that the quality of the pool of loans was very poor.  This study 
supports Shaw’s assertion that financial deregulation improves financial deepening. 
 
JEL codes:  G, G2, G21 
Keywords:  Transition Economies, Industrial Development, Financial Deregulation, 
Economic Growth, Eastern Europe 1 
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1.0   Introduction  
 
The following is an extract from my PhD on Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
 
The debate on financial market deregulation has a long pedigree and is marked with conflicting 
conclusions.  The difference in conclusions is due not only to differences in theoretical 
perspectives, but also to the way in which the link between deregulation and existing institutional 
set up, is taken into account.  Substantial literature, on the role of financial 
regulation/deregulation has emerged over the decades.  There are two extreme views of 
regulation/deregulation, namely: 
 
i)  regulation is necessary in order to reduce market failure, avoid banking crises and 
increase financial stability 
 
ii)  deregulation leads to a more efficient allocation of resources.  This leads to 
reduced costs and increased economic growth 
 
The focus here is on three countries (formerly Central and Eastern Europe), namely the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland.  The positions of other countries are also examined prior to 
deregulation, during and after deregulation.  In this chapter, theories surrounding regulation and 
deregulation are investigated.  Sources have been drawn from books and journal articles from the 
British Library and libraries of Irish Universities, databases – Emerald and Business Source 
Elite, and also from the William Davidson Institute, U.S.  The literature used dates from 1971 to 
2004 and includes all well-known experts on “regulation/deregulation”.  It encompasses views of   2
theorists world-wide, and includes those interested specifically in developing countries/transition 
countries and developed countries. 
 
The focus is on financial sector deregulation only, as this is the essence of the study.  No attempt 
is made to include deregulation of any other industries.  The differing views that dominate 
current thinking in this area are described in detail, along with current global events in terms of 
deregulation of financial markets and subsequent impact on economic growth.  The experiences 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to date, with deregulation are covered extensively. 
 
The aim of the literature review is to identify and discuss existing theories, to see what areas are 
currently being debated and to identify where the three countries fit into this debate.  Although 
these three countries differ in terms of structure and size, there are all in a similar position in that 
they are currently three of the ten Accession countries to the EU.  To date there is no study that 
analyses the impact of financial deregulation on economic growth, on these three countries 
specifically, from years 1990-2003.  This study fills the gap.  The aim of the study is to identify, 
compare and analyse the three countries and in doing so provide new information relating to the 
deregulation process in transition countries and subsequent effect on economic growth.  The 
results may be applied to the other seven
1 accession countries and other transition countries. 
 
Results of this study will answer the proposal:  does financial deregulation lead to and cause 
higher levels of economic growth? 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 1 introduces the topic 
Section 2 describes the main points of view relating to regulation and deregulation of financial 
markets 
Section 3 analyses the theoretical relationship between deregulation and industrial development 
Section 4 analysis the theoretical relationship between industrial development and economic 
growth 
                                                 
1 Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia   3
Section 5 analyses the theoretical relationship between financial sector deregulation and 
development, and economic growth 
Section 6 shows experiences of countries with financial market deregulation and resulting impact 
on economic growth 
Section 7 describes the events and experiences that have marked the process of deregulation for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
Section 8 provides an analysis of sections 
Section 9 investigates regulation versus deregulation of financial markets and what lies ahead 
Section 10 concludes the chapter and includes strengths and weaknesses of current 
literature/gaps in literature 
 
2.0  Regulation versus Deregulation of Financial Markets 
 
Regulation is described as “any policy which alters market outcomes by the exercise of some 
coercive government power
2.  Deregulation, on the other hand, is defined as the “removal of 
rules and restrictions”. 
 
Those that argue for regulation in the financial sector believe that competition in the financial 
markets is essentially imperfect, and therefore deregulation will only encourage further non-
competitive behaviour.  Here the emphasis is not on deregulation per se, but on the underlying 
non-competitive structure of the financial markets, which may be consolidated as a result of 
deregulation.  Under these conditions, government intervention and strict regulation may be 
necessary to deal with the consequences of market failure. 
 
Those in favour of deregulation argue that financial institutions, as intermediaries, affect the 
level of savings and the distribution of investment funds positively, and therefore encourage 
economic growth.  The premise upon which this conclusion is based is competition.  Increased 
competition between financial institutions leads to an increase in interest rates on investment, 
reduces the spread between rates on investment and lending, and ensures optimal credit 
                                                 
2 Stigler, G.J. “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, Bell Journal of Economics, 1971, pp3-21   4
allocation by channelling funds to the most feasible investment projects.  The overall impact on 
economic development and welfare is positive. 
 
Arestis and Demetriades
3 believe that some form of repression is necessary and relate their 
theories to Cyprus.  In terms of economic development “financial liberalisation is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for economic development”.  They say that financial 
repression with low or negative real interest rates does not prevent economic growth or financial 
deepening.  They cite Cyprus as an example as it has both a low real rate of interest and a level 
of financial depth which is higher than other developing countries.  They do not believe that the 
real rate of interest has an influence on total saving while recognising that that “financial saving 
is a more productive form of saving that other forms of saving”.  They argue that financial saving 
is determined by many factors, notably, the volatility of inflation, and economic and political 
uncertainty.  High real interest rates put upward pressure on the exchange rate which affects 
exports negatively and reduces inward investment.  They conclude that “financial liberalisation 
seems to be neither the only nor the best path on the way to economic development”. 
 
However McKinnon
4 argues that certain groups are not well served in developing countries.  
Rural areas and small borrowers are omitted from lending resources as governments ‘crowd-out’ 
resources to service their deficits on current accounts.  These groups become financially 
repressed as a result of financial repression in the financial system and rely on moneylenders, 
pawnbrokers and co-operatives.  Bank credit is much reduced as a result of regulations: 
depositors receive low or negative rates of interest (if inflation is high), which reduces their 
incentive to save.  Banks also underprice loans to borrowers (which suits governments) leading 
to reduced bank profit levels.  Savers then choose not to save, leading to even more reduced 
levels of credit.  Moneylenders charge very high rates of interest on borrowing, which small 
groups and rural customers such as farmers, have to pay.  Moneylenders
5 have access to useful 
information and they could legalise their operations and openly use this information in the guise 
of loan officers in the formal sector. 
                                                 
3 Arestis, P. and Demetrides, P. “On Financial Repression and Economic Development: the case of Cyprus”, 
Department of Economic and Management Science, Working Paper, 91-23, October 1991, pp1-22 
4 McKinnon, Ronald.  Money and Capital in Economic Development, Chapter 7: Financial Repression and Inflation, 
Washington D.C., The Brookings Institutions, 1973, pp68-69 
5 Ibid. A Preferred Strategy for overcoming repression, pp78   5
 
Shaw
6 also argues strongly for liberalisation, as it “tends to raise ratios of private domestic 
savings to income.  There are higher rates of interest for savers”.  He believes that increased 
liquidity will be apparent as a result of liberalisation, leading to financial deepening, which will 
reverse capital flight.  Liberalising
7 leads to “superior allocations of savings by widening and 
diversifying the financial markets in which investment opportunities compete for the savings 
flow”.  The real size of the monetary sector increases and there is an increase in the stability of 
growth in output and employment. 
 
On the other hand, Sachinides
8 stresses that regulations allow the government to borrow at a 
lower cost, although he recognises that research has suggested that regulation leads to 
inefficiency.  Here Arestis and Demetriades
9 argue that liberalisation means “upward financial 
repression” with a higher spread between borrower and saving rates of interest.  High interest 
rates on loans will negatively affect small firms while high interest rates on deposits will 
encourage banks to take on riskier investment projects, knowing they will be rescued by the 
government if the project fails.  They conclude that developing countries need low interest rates 
and government intervention in the form of regulations.  They also state further in Frowen
10 that 
the elimination of government ceilings on the lending rate leads to allocative inefficiency as 
banks have information on categories of borrowers, not individual borrowers.  Alternatively 
financial liberalisation may lead to too high real interest rates and a situation where banks accept 
all loanable funds leading to excess supply of funds and ‘bad’ loans. 
 
A report by the Council of Economic Advisers
11 observes (contrary to most pro-deregulation 
views) that regulation does not constrain competition but forces it into new channels.  This leads 
                                                 
6 Shaw, Edward. S. Financial Deepening in Economic Development, Chapter 1: Financial Deepening, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1973, pp9 
7 Ibid. pp10-14 
8 Sachinides, P.  “Financial Liberalisation in Cyprus, a public consideration”, The Cyprus Journal of Economics, 
Volume 7, No 2, December 1994, p19-35 
9 Ibid. Arestis, P and Demetriades, P. “To liberalise or not to liberalise, this is not the question”, Chapter 10: The 
Ethics of Interest Rate Liberalisation in Developing Countries, pp178-181 
10 Frowen, S.F. and McHugh, F. Financial Decision Making and Moral Responsibility, St Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1995 
11 “Financial Market Deregulation, Economic Report of the President, prepared by the Council of Economic 
Advisers”, American Banker, Volume 149, P5(9), 1984, March 13, pp6   6
to resource misallocation and consumers, shareholders and taxpayers face higher unnecessary 
costs.  Ceilings on interest rates lead to disintermediation as funds flow to other vehicles.  These 
unproductive directions cause industries to operate less efficiently. 
 
An advocate of regulation, Stiglitz
12 in Fry points that government intervention makes financial 
markets function better and improves the performance of the economy.  He also argues that 
intervention is necessary in prudential regulation and supervision.  Financial repression improves 
the quality of the pool of loan applicants and increases the firm’s equity. 
 
Caprio et al’s
13 opposing view, that “the economic performance of many countries deteriorated 
progressively under financial repression”, is supported by evidence of much lower growth and 
allocative efficiency for countries with negative real interest rates. 
 
 
3.0  Analysis of the Theoretical Relationship between Deregulation and 
Industrial Development 
 
Various views abound regarding the advantages and disadvantages of deregulation/regulation on 
efficiency of industries.  Driscoll
14 suggests investigating the source of the regulation – if 
political reasons instigate the regulation, it is likely that allocative efficiency is jeopardised, 
while if the reason for the regulation is to correct market failure, the result may assume a higher 
level of allocative efficiency.  In the case of the CEE economies they were, prior to 1989, totally 
controlled by the government for political and economic gain.  It is likely that large inefficiencies 
abounded up to 1989 (prior to liberalisation).  These economies did not have opportunities for 
market failure to appear, as the centralised approach did not allow market forces to be applied. 
 
                                                 
12 Fry, Maxwell, J. Money, Interest and Banking in Economic Development, 2
nd Edition, Chapter 6, Critics of 
Financial Liberalisation, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995, pp109 
13 Caprio, G., et al, Introduction and Overview: the case for Liberalisation and Some Drawbacks, in Caprio, G. et al, 
Financial Liberalisation, how far, how fast?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp5 
14 “Deregulation, Credit Rationing, Financial Fragility and Economic Performance”, OECD, Department of 
Economics and Statistics, Working Papers No. 1997, 1991, pp8   7
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
15 argue that credit rationing will exist regardless of the state of the 
financial market, be it liberalised or repressed.  Banks must discriminate in some way between 
borrowers, and as they cannot charge highly excessive interest rates because of the possibility of 
default, they will ration levels of credit.  While this may be the case generally, in these three 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) prior to 1989, it was almost impossible for 
private companies to receive any form of bank lending.  All resources were used to source 
government spending i.e. there was ‘crowding out’.  While some form of credit rationing may 
always be evident, the opening up of funding for companies other than government run 
industries, will always be a positive move for private industry in these countries. 
 
Guasch
16 advocates regulation if it reduces monopoly power, though he believes the government 
is not the best regulator due to necessary information.  Also politicians may use regulation to 
gain politically, which will not progress industries.  As these countries move towards full 
monetary union with the E.U., they come under the influence of the ECB (European Central 
Bank).  Firstly their economies will become more open, with increased competition from abroad 
along with increased opportunities.  It is likely that national governments will welcome any 
positive move with FDI (foreign direct investment) while acting to protect local industry.  These 
countries have an industrial sector made up of a large number of SME’s (Small and Medium size 
companies) and a small number of large companies.  The problem of monopolies being a 
problem is not likely to affect these countries for some years. 
 
Fitzgerald
17  proposes that lifting of regulations may encourage better risk management and 
narrower margins, but may lead to excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries.  Honohan 
and Stiglitz in Caprio
18 argue that strong regulatory capacity is necessary, however developing 
countries tend to have environments with weak regulatory capacity.  These three countries have 
moved from developing status to developed status, and as part of their EU accession, they must 
                                                 
15 Stiglitz, J and Weiss, A., “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review, 
1981, 77 (3) pp393-410  
16 Guasch, J. Luis and Hahn, Robert. W. “The Costs and Benefits of Regulation, Implications for Developing 
Countries”, World Bank Research Observer, 14 (1), 1997, pp137-158 
17 Fitzgerald, E.V.K. Capital Surges, Investment Instability and Income Distribution after Financial Liberalisation”, 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 6, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, 
Financial and Development Research Programme, May 1999, pp1-22 
18 Op. Cit. Caprio, G. et al, “Robust Financial Restraint in Financial Liberalisation”, 2001, PP32-34   8
conform fully to EU standards unless they make prior agreements.  This includes developing a 
strong regulatory and legal environment.  All three countries have made advancements in these 
areas, thus ensuring that the business environment is robust and can accommodate all EU 
criteria. 
 
Others say that deregulation of financial markets will lead to deepening of financial markets and 
increased competition for curb markets, who should be encouraged to enter formal markets, thus 
incurring less risk and lowering their costs.  Hanson and Rocka
19 in Fry suggest that taxation by 
the authorities of financial intermediation increases the financial sector’s instability by moving it 
into the informal and less regulated and untaxed part of the market (curb market).  Caprio et al
20 
states that financial repression causes evasion of regulation and the more costly it is to comply 
with a regulation, the more likely it is to be evaded.  As part of their EU accession process, these 
three countries have all reduced the size of the ‘black market’ especially Hungary, who had a 
serious problem with it.  It is unlikely that there will be a return to increased activity in the curb 
market. 
 
Shaw
21 recognises that certain groups may not want ‘market forces’ and that ‘interventionist’ 
policies may be more appropriate if market forces are mistrusted.  These countries are willing 
supporters of the EU, and believe that EU status will bring large gains for them.  They are strong 
supporters of free market forces and have already seen the benefits that a free market system has 
brought.   
 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have had years of financial repression, under 
communism.  From 1989 onwards, with the dismantling of barriers, these countries moved closer 
to Western style standards.  This included removing financial barriers such as the following: 
 
1.  Removal of restriction on capital account 
2.  Removal of interest rate controls 
3.  Despecialisation of financial institutions 
                                                 
19 Op. Cit. Fry, Chapter 16: “Macroeconomic Environment and Macroeconomic Policies”, 1995, pp387 
20 Op. Cit. Caprio, G. et al, 2001, pp5 
21 Op. Cit. Shaw, 1973   9
4.  Advancement of securities markets 
5.  Increase in the transparency of financial institutions 
6.  Harmonisation and simplification of prudential supervision across markets 
 
Prior to 1989 there were very few private companies in operation, especially in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary.  Poland had some private companies but like the other two countries, the 
government tended to control most companies and there was limited scope to set up privately.  
From 1989 this began to change, as large centralised companies were reorganised and 
dismantled, and small private firms emerged.  Increased opportunity for firms arose with the 
deregulation of financial markets, and there was increased access to funds and services.  The 
following section discusses the relationship between industrial development and economic 
growth. 
 
4.0  Analysis of the Theoretical Relationship between Industrial 
Development and Economic Growth       
 
1989 saw the beginning of transformation.  The three countries moved from a repressed state, to 
one embracing a market economy.  From the beginning of reform, there was the belief that small, 
privately owned firms would act as one of the main instigators of reform.  Jurajda and Terell
22 
argue that small start-up firms were the “stimulus for job creation in early transition”.  Jackson et 
al
23 state that the creation of new firms is vital for successful transformation, rather than merely 
restructuring existing firms.  Berkowitz and Cooper
24 agree that start-ups determine to some 
extent, the success of transition economies.  There are however, different views as to how 
important start-ups actually are – some view them as being more important than state enterprise 
reform.  Others believe that privatisation of state owned enterprises should be delayed in order 
that investment is available for new firms.  Brixiova et al
25 suggest that transition economies rely 
                                                 
22 Jurajda, S. and Terell, K.  “Job Growth in Early Transition, comparing two paths”, William Davidson Institute, 
University of Michigan Business School, August 2002, Paper No. 503, Abstract, pp1 
23 Jackson, J. et al “Firm Creation and Economic Transitions”, William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan 
Business School, Working Paper No. 238, July 1998, Abstract, pp1 
24 Berkowitz, D.W. and Cooper, D.J. “Start-Ups and Transition”, William Davidson Institute, University of 
Michigan Business School, Ppaer No 84, September 1997, pp1 
25 Brixiova, Z. et al. “Skill Acquisitions and Firm Creation in Transition Economies”, William Davidson Institute, 
University of Michigan Business School, Paper No 162, October 1999, pp3-4   10
on the development of a dynamic private sector in order to have increased growth and job 
creation.  Small and medium private firms are the driving force behind the recovery in both 
output and employment in transition economies.  Backhaus
26 however, advises caution and states 
that mass privatisation will not automatically lead to a market economy.  He states that there 
must be techniques to test for efficiency of these organisations, otherwise they are likely to 
continue operating inefficiently indefinitely.  Dickinson
27 proposes that the contribution of small 
private firms to the economies of Eastern Europe has been difficult to measure. 
 
While many authors agree that developing small firms is a key to increased prosperity, there is 
still rising unemployment in many of these countries.  Kirby and Watson’s
28 
view is that SME’s in Transition Economies contribute to job creation and domestic output.  
Ghatak et al
29 agree that SME’s contribute enormously to output and employment, while 
Weeks
30 studies contradicted this view.  He found that output per worker fell as size declined and 
that this reduction was larger than the reduction in wages in smaller enterprises. 
 
Kocenda
31 states that previous studies show that privatisation alone will not increase GDP 
growth.  However when accompanied by institutional reform, the result is positive.  They also 
found that majority foreign ownership leads to increased profitability while concentrated 
ownership improves performance. 
 
Angresano
32 argues that Western style economics does not work for CEEC’s.  Social impact was 
not taken into account, and the belief that the destruction of SOE’s would mean the mass 
                                                 
26 Bakhaus, J.G. “Mass Privatisation in Central and East European Countries”, Journal of Economic Studies, 
Volume 30, No 3, MCB University Press, 2003, pp196-2004 
27 Dickinson, P.G. “Transforming the Economies of Eastern Europe: an evaluation of the role and contribution of the 
small scale private sector (with specific reference to Poland)2, European Business Review, MCB University Press, 
Volume 12, No 2, 2000, pp84-92  
28 Kirby, D.A. and Watson, A. Small Firms and Economic Development in Developed and Transition Economies: A 
Reader, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003 
29 Ghatak, S. et al, “European Integration and the Survival of Polish Small Enterprises”, edited by Homi Katrak and 
Roger Strange, Chapter 8 in Small Scale Enterprises in Developing and Transitional Countries, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, 2002, pp137 
30 Ibid, Chapter 2, The Efficiency of Small Enterprises in Developing Countries: an Empirical Analysis by John 
Weeks, pp15-16 
31 Kocenda, E. and Svenjar, J., “The Impact of Czech Mass Privatisation on Corporate Governance”, MCB 
University Press, Journal of Economic Studies, Vol 30, No ¾, 2003, pp278-293 
32 Angresano, J. “Alternative Scenario for Central and East European Transformation”, Journal of Economic 
Studies, Volume 21, No. 3, 1994, pp22-38   11
creation of private firms has not been forthcoming.  The overall result has been loss of industry.  
He argues that an ‘organised’ market approach (like in China) might have worked better here or 
the negotiated Scandinavian approach which includes all parties – public, private and all other 
organisations.  The opening up of markets, and the deregulation of financial markets all helped to 
create a business environment that was conducive to the setting up of new, private firms.  Overall 
the prevailing view here is that new firms contribute positively to economic growth. 
 
5.0  Analysis of the Theoretical Relationship between Financial Sector 
Deregulation and Development, and Economic Growth 
 
Financial deregulation permits increased financial intermediation.  Today there is accepted belief 
that financial intermediation channels resources towards activities with high rates of return.   
Obviously the level of intermediation would have to be efficient in order for good investment 
opportunities to be identified.  Efficient intermediation will lower the cost of investment, and 
savings that are transformed into investment can be used to fund an increased number of 
projects.  Becsi and Wang
33 argue that intermediaries allow individual savers access to large 
investment projects, which they would not be able to access or afford without the pooling of 
funds of small savers.  Savers also get access to riskier and potentially high return projects, 
without having to bear the full risk individually.  They can also invest in long-term projects, 
without tying up funds for unnecessarily long time periods, and they have access to already 
screened projects.  Everett and Kelly
34 argue that the ready availability of credit is an important 
factor in the growth process, within the widely accepted position that financial liberalisation 
supports growth in developing economies.  The absence of finance hinders the exploitation of 
opportunities, while efficient and deepening financial markets act to foster investment 
opportunities.  These findings are in line with previous studies:  Shaw
35, McKinnon
36 found that 
as financial markets developed, the level of per capita income rose at a comparable rate.   
                                                 
33 Becsi, Zsolt, and Wang, Ping. “Financial Development and Growth”, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic 
Review, Fourth Quarter, 1997, pp46-59 
34 Kelly, John. and Everett, Mary. “Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth in Ireland2, Quarterly Bulletin, 
Central Bank, Autumn 2004, pp91-112 
35 Op. Cit. 1973 
36 Op. Cit. 1973   12
McLean and Shrestha
37 comment that financial liberalisation increases economic growth by 
increasing capital flows, which in turn raises the domestic investment rate. 
 
King and Levine
38 found that banking sector development contributed to economic growth in the 
long run, while Boyd and Prescott
39, Stiglitz
40 and Arestis et al
41 all agree that bank development 
contributes more to economic growth than stock market development.  Levine
42 argues that a 
well-developed financial system leads to faster growth.  The two factors that influence economic 
growth positively are: having a selection of privately owned banks offering finance to private 
enterprises and liquid stock exchanges.  Others argue that the relationship between financial 
sector development and economic growth is a demand-following relationship, indicating a causal 
relationship from economic growth to financial development.  This thinking has been more or 
less outdated by current researchers who point to the supply leading relationship.  The belief here 
is that financial development leads to and causes economic growth. 
 
6.0  Experiences of countries with financial market deregulation and resulting 
impact on economic growth 
  
As more and more countries move from ‘developing’ country to developed country status, there 
is an increasing move towards liberalisation of financial sectors.  It is likely that this trend will 
continue and although some theorists now believe the liberalisation can cause more problems 
than it solves, we are unlikely to see any wholescale reversal towards ‘repression’.  The results 
are varied, and here specific country experiences are reviewed.   
                                                 
37 McLean, Ben and Shrestha, Sona, “International Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth”, Reserve Bank 
of Australia Research Discussion Paper, 2002-2003 
38 King, R.G. and Levine, R. “Finance and Growth: Schumpter Might be Right”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
1993a, 108, pp717-738 
39 Boyd, J. and Prescott, E. “Financial Intermediary Coalitions”, Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, Vol 38, pp211-
232 
40 Op. Cit. 1981 
41 Arestis, P et al, Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Role of Stock Markets, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Ohio State of University Press, Issue 1, 2001, pp16-41 
42 Levine, Ross “More on Finance and Growth: More Finance, More Growth?”,  Report by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, 2003, pp31-46   13
Rockoff
43 states that as far back as the nineteenth century in the U.S. the free banking era in the 
U.S. produced few fluctuations in the macroeconomy, and he believes that it helped 
macroeconomic stability.  There is recognised belief that macroeconomic stability is an 
important requisite as a basis for economic growth.   
 
Zank
44 comments on studies by the World Bank on Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean which show that privately owned banks operate more efficiently than state owned 
banks.  He believes that financial policy reform and privatisation are the instigators of improved 
efficiency and stability of the financial system, which in turn leads to a much improved 
economic performance.  Further, when banks are privatised, there is increased confidence in the 
banking system.  This leads to increased activity and increased intermediation, which leads to an 
increase in savings and investment.  These are positive indicators for increased economic 
growth. 
 
Galbis
45 examined eight countries (Argentina, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda) experiences with reforms and found that reforms were successful in “maintaining 
appropriate real interest rate and achieving financial sector deepening” and that efficiency of 
intermediation increased through reduced operating costs.  When interest rates are set at an 
appropriate rate, this increases the level of credit, thus benefiting industry.  This leads to 
increased levels of economic activity which in turn increases the level of economic growth. 
 
Grabel
46 studied five countries (Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela, Korea and the Philippines) and 
discovered that stock market volatility increased during the financial liberalisation period.   
Caprio
47 surveyed 86 incidents of bank insolvency and argues that premature financial 
                                                 
43 Rockoff, H. Chapter 3, “Lessons from the American Experience with Free Banking”, in Unregulated Banking, 
Chaos or Order, Forrest Capie, Geoffrey E. Wood, MacMilan Academic and Professional Ltd, Basingstoke, 1971, 
pp77-104 
44 Zank, N. S. Reforming Financial Systems: Policy Change and Privatisation, Chapter 6: Developing a framework 
for financial reform and privatisation, New York, Greenwood Press, 1991, pp71 
45 Galbis, V. “Financial Sector Reforms in Eight Countries: Issues and Results”, IMF Working Paper WP/95/141, 
Policy Development and Review Department, Summary, pp3 
46 Grabel, I. “Assessing the Impact of Financial Liberalisation on Stock Market Volatility in Selected Countries”, 
Journal of Development Studies, Volume 31, No. 6, August 1995, p903, pp10 
47 Caprio, G. “ Banking on Crises, Expensive Lessons from Recent Financial Crises”, World Bank, Development 
Research Group, Sept 1998, pp9-19   14
liberalisation occurred in almost all crises in Latin America in the 1980’s and East Asia in the 
1990’s. 
 
Bisat
48 investigated countries Argentina, Chile and the Philippines and found that they all 
experience financial crises following financial sector reforms.  Demeriguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache
49 analysed 53 countries
50 between 1980 and 1995 and found that improved financial 
development followed financial liberalisation.  However they also found that the fragility of 
banking systems increased with liberalisation though it did not necessarily mean that a financial 
crisis would ensue.  Low levels of corruption served to protect the banking sector and reduced 
the severity of a banking crisis if it occurred.  They distinguish between repressed financial 
sectors (those with an average negative interest rate during the three years preceding financial 
liberalisation) and restrained financial sectors (liberalised from a position of positive interest 
rates).  Their studies showed that repressed sectors gained overall from liberalisation even if a 
crisis took place, while restrained financial sectors were left without any gain if a crisis followed 
liberalisation as all gains were nullified by the banking crisis.  
 
Caprio
51 agrees with Demeriguc-Kunt and Detragiache (above) that strong law enforcement and 
a resulting strong institutional environment led to a financial crisis being avoided after 
liberalisation.  Coricelli
52 in Caprio focused on the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
found that “financial liberalisation increased their vulnerability to financial crisis”.  While 
sophisticated financial markets were formed, the majority of the economy dealt in a barter type 
of exchange.  Schull and Hanweck
53 studied deregulation in the U.S. and found that mergers, 
resulting from deregulation, led to banks achieving much increased profitability with no 
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corresponding reduction in costs.  Deregulation has led to customers having increased substitutes 
but the relaxed merger policy meant the development of a small group of large banks.  Increased 
profitability in banks leads to increased investment funds becoming available for viable 
businesses and worthwhile projects.  Once these projects are underway and begin to show returns 
on investment, this will impact positively on economic activity and growth. 
 
Daianu and Vranceanu
54 comment that the reality of the ‘invisible hand’ is that markets are 
imperfect and distortions may increase as a result of further liberalisation.  While economists 
used to believe that opening up of the capital account was a natural part of financial 
liberalisation, there is now growing belief that some capital controls should be in place in certain 
situations
55.   
 
Gibson and Tsakalotos
56 concentrated on five European countries
57 and comment on the effects 
of financial liberalisation on capital flight.  Their results showed that the rates of return were 
significant for Spain and Portugal, and a decrease in interest rates in either the current period in 
Spain or the previous period in Portugal increased capital flight in the current period
58.  Khoury
59 
states that deregulation of the UK financial markets led to “increased competition in both equity 
and gilt markets, lowered transaction costs and increased market liquidity”.  His statistical tests
60 
showed that in the US. deregulation led to increases on the return to equity for banks.  Sandor in 
Bonin and Szekely
61  argue caution when proceeding with financial liberalisation, as 
deregulation in Scandinavia, the U.K. and the U.S. led to high rates of economic growth and 
later, recession.   
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Warman and Thirlwall
62 argue that in the financial liberalisation literature, there is “no clear 
distinction made between financial saving and total saving”.  They examined Mexico over this 
period and found “very little evidence that movements in real interest rates have any significant 
effect on economic performance.  Financial saving grew with a positive real rate of interest but 
also with negative real interest rates, indicating that savings were highly correlated with levels of 
income”.  Dalla
63 studied the effect of financial liberalisation on Korea and concludes that its 
mix of government intervention and financial liberalisation was a success.  Its results include: 
positive interest rates, increased competition between banks, improved credit programmes and 
increased efficiency of the banking system.  Improvements in efficiency of the banking system, 
as a result of financial deregulation, will have wider effects for the macroeconomy.  There will 
be improved access to credit for all firms, which will increase investment opportunities, and lead 
to economic development and growth. 
 
Fry
64 found that Uruguay’s financial liberalisation in 1977 did not affect interest rates in that 
they did not rise to any great levels while Fernandes
65 in Fry, notes that in Argentina “each 
financial institution closed by the Central Bank was offering the highest interest rate in the 
market” at the time of its closure.  The overall conclusion here is that the decision of some 
developing Asian countries to take their own gradual path towards liberalisation, rather than 
participating in the euphoria of Western economists, was the correct one.  Vos
66, in Griffith-
Jones and Drabek, reviewed the effects of interest rate liberalisation on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Philippines, Turkey and Uruguay, and concludes that higher real interest rates stimulate higher 
financial savings i.e. interest bearing financial assets, and lowers household savings while 
depressing corporate profits and savings.  Firms switch to using internally generated funds rather 
than borrowing at expensive rates. 
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Clarke
67 concludes that Chile and Argentina’s problems that led to financial collapse, were 
exacerbated by high interest rates and argues that positive but low real interest rates are needed 
to ensure macroeconomic stability, along with broad regulation of the financial system.   
Williams
68 investigated Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and concludes that “regulation 
affected market share negatively in all countries researched”. 
 
Hickson and Turner
69 argue that South Asia’s banking crises would have been limited, if nor for 
the deregulation which had taken place earlier.  Johnston
70 comments that financial liberalisation 
(1977-1980) preceded a financial crisis in the 1980’s in Argentina, while Chile and Korea had a 
gradual process towards financial liberalisation and fared better than those with rapid reform. 
 
In Caprio
71 Negret and Landa argue that Mexico’s problems did not stem from liberalisation 
alone, as they already suffered from poor pre-conditions for privatisation and liberalisation, and 
did not take corrective action at appropriate times.  Maskooki
72 supports the above, arguing that 
as financial deregulation took place before adequate measures were in place in Mexico, this led 
to an inefficient banking system leading to destabilisation of the financial sector.  Sachs
73 and 
Woo point out the “financial panic among international investors brought Pacific Asia to its 
knees in 1998”.  They believe that national weaknesses existed that were exacerbated by a 
recommendations such as closing financial institutions. 
 
Levine
74 comments on the consistency of results of previous studies (by various authors on 
difference countries) on financial systems and economic growth.  The conclusions reached are 
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that countries grow faster if they had a well-developed financial system.  This includes having a 
selection of privately owned banks offering finance to private enterprises and liquid stock 
exchanges.  Both of these factors influence economic growth positively. 
 
In line with this view, Barth et al
75 argue that state ownership of banks means poorly developed 
banks, non-banks and stock markets.  A poorly developed financial system means reduced 
opportunities to deepen financial markets and developed innovative financial instruments.  Credit 
levels will be lower which means that industries will not have sufficient access to loans.  There 
will be fewer opportunities for firms to grow which will impact negatively on economic growth.   
 
A report
76 on the Australian financial deregulation states that monetary policy is more effective 
in an atmosphere of financial deregulation.  It “probably contributes to macroeconomic 
performance and economic growth”.  Gupta and Yuan
77 studied 19 countries
78 that liberalised 
their stock markets.  Results show that liberalisation facilitates economic growth, by reducing 
both the “overall cost of capital in the economy”, and “market imperfections that drive a wedge 
between the internal and external cost of capital”. 
 
Oks
79 analysed the relationship between financial sector development and economic growth in 
11 CEE’s
80 and found a positive relationship.  However he did not find a causal relationship 
between the two factors for all countries.  He states that tests in the Czech Republic and Poland 
“indicate the causal relationship to run from financial sector development to economic growth”.  
Eddy and Hviding
81 state that over the last two decades, there has been enormous growth in 
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financial activity in OECD countries.  In some instance this has been due to financial 
deregulation while in others, different factors have contributed to this growth.  There has been 
evidence of increased efficiency of financial markets while effects on economic efficiency 
cannot be directly attributed to financial deregulation. 
 
7.0  Events and Experiences that have Marked the Process of Deregulation for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland  
 
For transition economies eager to join the EU, they must ensure their policies operate in harmony 
with those countries in the EU.  As part of the Single Market Policy, the European Union (EU) 
has introduced new competition and deregulation measures aimed at making the Western 
European financial sector more competitive internationally.  These measures are based on two 
principles: (a) minimal government intervention mainly in the form of risk-reducing regulation; 
and (b) “national treatment” which allows financial institutions to operate in any part of the EU, 
provided that they comply with the regulatory framework of one of the member states.  This 
framework has significant implications for the CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) countries as 
they are now part of the EU body of legislation (acquis communautaires) which is binding not 
only on existing members, but also on countries likely to join the EU in the future.  As a result of 
the positive vote in the Nice treaty, which ratified the position of ten new members’ accession to 
the EU, CEE’s are now faced with intensive pressure to harmonise their financial system towards 
EU standards.   
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Table 1.1 
 
 
Notes: 
*Czech Republic: Private banks grew steadily from 1991, when state financial institutions held 
around 15% of total commercial banks.  This fell to under 2% by 1995
82. 
Hungary: In 1979 the Central European International Bank Ltd was set up as an offshore bank.  
This was a joint venture of the National Bank of Hungary and six Western banks.  In 1983 small 
financial institutions were established to finance research and development and venture capital
83. 
Poland: The number of commercial banks increased from 6 to 75 in 1990
84. 
**Czech Republic: The Prague Stock Exchange opened in April 1993, as a joint venture of 
twelve banks and five brokerage companies
85. 
Hungary opened the Budapest Stock Exchange on 19
th June 1990, with forty one banks, financial 
institutions and securities trading companies involved
86. 
                                                 
82 CNB (1993, 1994, 1996) in Transition Banking, Financial Development of Central and Eastern Europe, by Ronald 
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84 Ibid. Chapter 5: Poland, pp134 
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Overview  of change in regulatory constraints in CEE’s as a result of liberalisation 
                                                              Czech Republic            Hungary         Poland 
Removal of restrictions on                    2001                             2001               2001 
capital account: 
Removal of interest rate controls:         1991                             1991               1990 
Despecialisation of financial                 1991*                           1979*             1990*    
institutions: 
Advancement of securities markets:     1993**                         1990**            1991** 
Increase in the transparency of              1994***                       1992***         1993***  
financial institutions: 
Harmonisation and simplification         2001****                    1998****        2000**** 
of prudential supervision across 
markets:    21
Poland: The Warsaw Stock Exchange, in accordance with the March 1991 Act on Public Trading 
in Securities and Trust Funds, began on April 1991
87. 
***Czech Republic: CNB has compiled a consolidated balance sheet for the commercial banking 
sector since 30
th June 1994
88. 
Hungary: The National Bank of Hungary developed a bank supervision division, to perform on 
site audits and to exercise central bank control on data collected jointly with the State Banking 
Supervision Agency.  The SBSA can audit banks and obtain all information judged as useful to 
impose sanctions
89. 
Poland: The February 1993 Law on Financial Restructuring was introduced to solve the problem 
of bad debts and encourage banks to disclose complete information
90. 
****Czech Republic: At the beginning of 2002 a medium-term banking supervision concept was 
approved for 2002-2004.  The focus is to complete full harmonisation with EU law and raise the 
quality of supervisory work to internationally recognised standards
91. 
Hungary has a unified financial sector supervisory framework since April 2002
92 which operates 
under the direction of the Government and is supervised by the Minister of Finance.  The goal of 
HFSA management is to upgrade financial sector supervision. 
Poland: The Commission for Banking Supervision was set up in September 1998 to supervise 
domestic banks, their branches and representative offices of foreign banks.  The Commission 
ensures banks comply with Acts, statues and other legal provisions and financial standards that 
have put in place
93.   
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8.0  Analysis of Sections 
 
There is clear debate between the regulatory and deregulatory views described.  Here we 
describe the main regulatory and deregulatory views as they apply to the countries of, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland and provide a critical analysis of same: 
 
a)  In section 2.0, Views of the pro-regulation group, we find the argument for regulation is 
strongly defended by Arestis and Demetraides, who base assumptions on their home country, 
Cyprus.  While Cyprus represents one of the ten accession countries to the EU and in this sense 
is similar to these three countries, there are vast difference in their financial sectors, economic 
stances and outlook.  Arestis and Demetriades argue that financial liberalisation will not increase 
the efficiency of financial markets and the allocation of investment.  Here they discuss Cyprus 
specifically, which has a very small number of banks (14) compared to that of the Czech 
Republic (37), Hungary (31), and Poland (79).  The reality is that, after financial deregulation, 
the banks in these CEE’s have tended to offer loans to companies, based on their ability to offer 
collateral.  Firms are subject to scrutiny about financial background and potential of the 
investment project.  It is likely that allocational efficiency is strengthened in these circumstances 
and not weakened, as suggested by these authors.  Also, contrary to the suggestion that 
governments will bail banks out in times of trouble, these banks know they will not be rescued 
automatically, if they are in trouble.  They have been allowed to fail in the past. 
 
These authors are also concerned about the impact on small firms, whose vulnerability will 
increase as they face higher interest rates.  Without access to internal funds, these firms have no 
choice but to borrow at high rates of interest, unlike larger firms who will have increased access 
to internal profits.  This may lead to smaller firms being squeezed out of the market.  Again the 
Cypriot industrial sector is made up of fundamentally smaller firms, as opposed to the larger 
types of organisation, which abound in CEE’s.  Cyprus has had a budget deficit for many years 
yet it is not a serious problem, as the government has serviced its debt at low interest rates.  This 
will not be the case with EU accession as the EU interest rate will prevail, and as this means a 
higher cost of borrowing, the Cypriot government will be under pressure to reduce its deficit.  
This is likely to lead to capital spending being curtailed, which will reduce competitiveness.    23
This argument can be seen to have some justification when applied to Cyprus but while 
regulation may currently favour a country such as Cyprus (and this will change rapidly with EU 
membership), it does not appear to offer the same advantages for transition economies of Eastern 
Europe.  The disadvantages of financial deregulation were felt by all three countries in that there 
was little scope for industrial activity and development.  Access to credit was very limited for 
smaller firms and households and there were few financial instruments to incest in.  The 
government crowded out the private sector and dominated the credits allocated by the financial 
sector.  Deregulation has altered this completely.  Unlike the democratic Cypriot government, the 
centralised government of CEE’s did not favour private businesses and they had an unduly harsh 
time under the Communist regime. 
 
Liberalisation led to the privatisation of firms and banks, and individuals and household began to 
have access to liberalised markets and new financial instruments.  While inflation was an initial 
problem for all three countries, all have made successful efforts to reduce inflation to acceptable 
levels, needed for EU entry. 
 
As households increase savings (initially there is massive spending of the monetary ‘overhang’ 
though this stabilises over time), there is an increase in the supply of loanable funds.  Businesses 
and investors have access to previously restricted credit.  With new business opportunities 
available to CEE’s, the increase in economic activity is likely to increase economic growth 
substantially. 
 
Stiglitz states that financial repression improves the quality of the pool of loan applicants, and 
increases the firm’s equity.  However it can be argued that in economies with financial 
repression, there is limited credit allocation.  In the CEE’s the government was the main 
benefiter of credit and as mentioned above, the private sector was crowded out.  There was not 
scope for private businesses to compete for the limited credit available.  Credit was allocated to 
companies who had previously been allocated credit, regardless of their performance profit wise.  
If companies were in difficulties and could not repay debts as planned and agreed, these debts 
were rolled over and extended if needed.  The quality of the pool of loan applicants was very 
poor, though it took time for the problem to be highlighted.  This only took place when   24
liberalisation occurred and accounting and supervisory controls were introduced and applied.  In 
the prevailing environment of financial repression, potentially successful projects were excluded 
from credit, and banks’ equity did not appreciate.  The liberalised market opened up credit 
facilities which benefited these projects. 
 
Shaw believes that liberalisation leads to financial deepening.  CEE’s have seen loan interest 
rates fall from over 13% in the Czech Republic to 5.75%, from over 27% in Hungary to 6.5%, 
and from almost 55% in Poland to 8.75%.  In this time period, the spread (difference between 
loan and deposit rate) has also fallen from a high of 9 in the Czech Republic to 2.25. from 11 in 
Hungary to 3,, and from 13 to 3 in Poland
94.  However this has not prevented increased activity 
and development of financial markets.  They have all experienced financial deepening (financial 
development).  An increase in financial activity leads to development of financial markets and 
instruments.  This increases the level of economic activity and acts as a stimulant for economic 
growth. 
 
b)  Section 3.0 looks at countries experiences with deregulation and effects on economic 
growth, and finds that overall results are positive.  Some countries found success with 
liberalisation, while for others there was a positive and negative aspect.  However, it was found 
that countries with poor macroeconomic conditions and/or inadequate financial systems were 
more vulnerable after deregulation.  The initial conditions were crucial to the end result. 
 
Galbis’ studies found that the efficiency of financial intermediation increased with financial 
liberalisation.  The three CEE countries all suffer from low financial intermediation levels, by 
comparison with countries of the Euro area.  This is likely to change as further liberalisation 
leads to markets deepening and developing, as increased numbers of financial instruments act to 
attract new customers.  It is likely that intermediation levels will rise in the CEE’s.  If increased 
efficiency results through reduced operating costs, the gap between their intermediation level and 
the rest of the Eurozone should continue to fall in the future.  This will lead to increased business 
opportunities thus stimulating economic growth.  Various studies have blamed financial 
liberalisation for financial crises in different countries, while others have pointed to the years of 
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financial repression prior to reform.  The CEE’s are now in a position where they have gotten 
over the first hurdle of financial reform and although some financial institutions have 
experienced difficulties, and have been closed down
95, most negative aspects of reform have now 
been endured.        
 
Studies agree that strong law enforcement and low levels of corruption in other countries helped 
to negate aspects of financial crises if they occurred.  The CEE’s have experienced levels of 
corruption in the past.  However these have reduced dramatically as EU officials ensure that 
these countries are keeping within acceptable boundaries of behaviour when conducting their 
financial affairs. 
 
Sandor advises caution when proceeding with financial liberalisation, as it may be that initially 
positive economic growth levels are recorded, followed closely by recession.  Currently CEE’s 
are being closely monitored by the EU and full accession to the EU will lead to economic benefit 
for all three (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).  Recession in these countries is now less 
likely for them now than at any point in the past, as EU officials ensure that these countries are 
keeping within acceptable boundaries of behaviour when conducting their financial affairs. 
 
Dalla’s studies of Korea concludes that is mix of government intervention and financial 
liberalisation contributes to its successful outcome.  The CEE’s are in a position where they are 
all pursuing financial liberalisation, while being closely monitored by the EU.  It is likely that 
this combination of liberalisation and an adherence to EU rules, will ensure a positive outcome 
for all three countries. 
 
The CEE’s have all undergone financial liberalisation and endured many hurdles, including the 
closing of insolvent banks.  The countries that faced the most difficult circumstances after 
financial liberalisation, were those who had major difficulties before reform.  The CEE’s are not 
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in this position.  While they have all had macroeconomic instability in the past, this has now 
been reduced to acceptable levels.  Financial market liberalisation should continue to aid bank 
performance, which should in turn lead to increased financial development, leading to increased 
economic growth.   
 
9.0  Regulation versus Deregulation of Financial markets – What Lies Ahead? 
 
Repression was used in financial markets in the past, but most countries have accepted that 
regulation is now the norm and not the exception.  Various strong arguments have been 
forwarded in favour of regulation and while this may have been a more appropriate strategy in 
the past, the changing economic structure has meant that its use today, is more limited.   
Globalisation as meant increased interdependencies amongst countries and while this can lead to 
increased exposure to external shocks, these shocks are weakened as they are absorbed by a 
larger body than previously.  Globalisation has also led to increased openness and removal of 
barriers, and regulation of financial markets is restricted in this environment. 
 
Supporters of deregulation point to the advantages of increased competition which results after 
liberalisation i.e. increased efficiency, increased choice, etc.  The reality is that liberalisation of 
financial markets, while opening up entry, has led to mergers in almost all countries, leading to 
increased concentration.  We now have a reduced number of larger banks than previously, as 
smaller banks find it increasingly harder to compete in this market.  Currently there is increased 
recognition of the informal market or curb market and a desire to include this market, as in 
instances it is more efficient than the formal market.  Presently no advantage is taken of the 
expertise of its personnel in assessing loan applicants and the knowledge that these people hold 
in relation to their immediate environment.  It is assumed that the two markets (formal and 
informal) will continue to operate in parallel without any attempt to include this sector and utilise 
the expertise within.  Efforts should be made to make the transition to the formal economy more 
attractive for the curb market, with training and development, and tax incentives.  This should 
lead to a more equitable allocation of credit resources, with loan applicants paying lower rates of 
interest whilst still having access to reasonable amounts of credit.  This will benefit those who 
are currently not catered for in the formal economy, like farmers and country dwellers.   27
 
There is increased understanding that some form of supervision is necessary, while the 
regulatory era is more or less over.  Supervision is a more expensive form of monitoring than 
regulation, as it involves constant overseeing rather than irregular checks with appropriate 
sanction, if necessary.  Nonetheless, supervision as a tool of monitoring appears to be the most 
suitable for financial markets if we are to avoid instances life Barings Bank and Allfirst, where 
both banks lost millions due to lax controls.  The EU countries are all introducing supervisory 
bodies for financial institutions as the role of the individual Central Banks changes, with the 
presence of the European Central Bank. 
 
There is concern over the role of central banks as ‘lender of last resort’ and criticism that central 
banks tend to act as lender of ‘first resort’ in many instances.  This is changing in CEE’s as 
banks have to comply with EU regulations, which includes having transparent operations and 
accounting systems.  While central banks, in the past, have had problems deciding if a bank was 
illiquid or insolvent this should not now be a problem, and appropriate corrective action should 
take place once any discrepancies are noticed.  It is now believed more extensively that 
‘contagion’ problems are not a grave matter of controversy as previously thought, as the general 
public are now more financially aware and trust the banking system.  It is seen to be a robust 
system and problems in one bank are not viewed as being contagious for the whole banking 
system. 
 
It is universally agreed that macroeconomic stability is a natural pre-requisite for financial 
reform.  However there is also agreement that financial reform cannot be held back indefinitely if 
the macroeconomic environment is not suitable for immediate reform.  Efforts should be made to 
ensure that both areas proceed simultaneously, perhaps on a more gradual path to reform.  The 
CEE’s because of their ‘accession status’ are not locked into agreements to proceed, in order to 
meet the criteria for convergence.  Strenuous efforts have been made by all three countries to 
meet this convergence criteria, though presently some gaps appear. 
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10.0    Conclusion – Strengths and Weaknesses of Current Literature/Gaps in 
Literature     
 
This study investigates the impact of deregulation of financial markets on industrial 
development, the development of financial institutions and the resulting effect on economic 
development and growth of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  Presently very little 
empirical work has been undertaken on this subject for these three countries simultaneously, and 
the purpose of this study is to address this gap.  The development of efficient financial markets 
within a strong economic environment, is one of the aims of all countries and is especially 
important for those experiencing transition to the developed world.  These three countries have 
all begun the process of liberalising financial markets and industries, and have effected change in 
order to meet EU criteria.  To date no significant measure of financial deregulation on the 
efficiency of financial institutions and economic development has been carried out. 
 
The most important development on financial deregulation and economic growth in the 
literature, are the works of Levine, King and Shaw.  The intention here was to build on the work 
of these authors, who have studied financial deregulation and the impact on economic growth in 
different countries.  The importance of economic growth has always been a factor for 
governments of developed/developing countries.  However the importance of financial markets 
as an engine for growth has only recently been recognised.  Authors Levine (and others) notes 
that firms who have previously been constrained due to limited external financial being 
available, can now (due to deregulation and increased development of the banking system) avail 
of these funds.  This increase in industrial growth improves economic growth overall.   
Noticeable gaps in literature concern the causal relationship between industrial growth (resulting 
from financial deregulation) and economic growth.  To date there is no study that addresses this 
relationship in the three countries.  Regarding financial deregulation and development of the 
financial system, and economic growth, Oks addresses this to some extent by examining 
financial sector development and economic growth in eleven CEE’s, but does not find conclusive   29
evidence.  Andreisz et al (2003)
96 examine this topic in Poland and find support for the causation 
between financial sector development and economic development.  The point of this study was 
to address the gap in literature on the relationship between financial deregulation and industrial 
growth, and economic growth.  Also attempts were made to build on the work quoted above by 
examining these three countries specifically vis-à-vis financial deregulation/development and 
economic growth.  The study carried out primary research to investigate the impact of financial 
deregulation on industrial development.  We included a longer time span over which to estimate 
results.  Industrial Production was used as a proxy for GDP, and we extend the different 
measures for financial sector efficiency, used as exogenous variables and add M0, M2, 3 month 
Treasury Bill rate, credit to non-financial sector, credit to government, and exports and imports.  
Open economy effects were examined, and an increased number of statistical techniques used.  
Ratio analysis was used to establish relationships between financial variables and economic 
growth.  Financial statements from banks in the three countries were analysed to assess bank 
profitability and efficiency after financial deregulation.   
 
Finally by answering the question, “does financial deregulation supports higher levels of 
economic growth” the following sub-questions are also answered: 
 
a)  has financial deregulation impacted on industrial development and in what way? 
b)  is causality established between industrial development and economic growth and in 
what direction/s? 
c)  is causality established between financial development and economic growth and in what 
direction/s? 
d)  what impact has financial deregulation on economic policy and monetary policy, and is 
there a subsequent impact on economic development? 
 
The aim of the research is to provide useful information that will be used by academics, bankers, 
Central Banks, ECB and policymakers.  The results of the study may be applied directly to 
developing/transition economies.     
                                                 
96 Andriesz, Ewa et al, “The Linkage between Financial Liberalisation and Economic Development: Empirical 
Evidence from Poland”, 2003, City University London, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper Series, No. 
03/03   30
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